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Week after week, we see the global economy contracting 
at a pace worse than predicted by the gloomiest analysts. 
We are now, it is clear, in no ordinary recession but are 
headed for a global depression that could last for many 
years.
What I would like to do here today is first, to briefly 
discuss the origins and dynamics of this crisis; and, sec-
ond, to explore a strategy for the global left that would 
respond to the current crisis in the context of the chal-
lenges coming from the technocratic capitalist center and 
the populist capitalist right.
The Fundamental Crisis: 
Overaccumulation
Orthodox economics has long ceased to be of any help 
in understanding the crisis. Non-orthodox economics, on 
the other hand, provides extraordinarily powerful insights 
into the causes and dynamics of the current crisis. From 
the progressive perspective, what we are seeing is the 
intensification of one of the central crises or »contradic-
tions« of global capitalism: the crisis of overproduction, 
also known as overaccumulation or overcapacity. This is 
the tendency for capitalism to build up, in the context of 
heightened inter-capitalist competition, tremendous pro-
ductive capacity that outruns the population’s capacity to 
consume owing to income inequalities that limit popular 
purchasing power. The result is an erosion of profitabil-
ity, leading to an economic downspin. 
To understand the current collapse, we must go back in 
time to the so-called Golden Age of Contemporary Capi-
talism, the period from 1945 to 1975. This was a period 
of rapid growth both in the center economies and in the 
underdeveloped economies – one that was partly trig-
gered by the massive reconstruction of Europe and East 
Asia after the devastation of the Second World War, and 
partly by the new socioeconomic arrangements and in-
struments based on a historic class compromise between 
Capital and Labor that were institutionalized under the 
new Keynesian state
But this period of high growth came to an end in the 
mid-1970s, when the center economies were seized by 
stagflation, meaning the coexistence of low growth with 
high inflation, which was not supposed to happen under 
neoclassical economics.
Stagflation, however, was but a symptom of a deeper 
cause: the reconstruction of Germany and Japan and the 
rapid growth of industrializing economies like Brazil, 
Taiwan, and South Korea added tremendous new produc-
tive capacity and increased global competition, while in-
come inequality within countries and between countries 
limited the growth of purchasing power and demand, thus 
eroding profitability. This was aggravated by the massive 
oil price rises of the seventies.
The most painful expression of the crisis of overpro-
duction was global recession of the early 1980s, which 
was the most serious to overtake the international econo-
my since the Great Depression, that is, before the current 
crisis.
Capitalism tried three escape routes from the conun-
drum of overproduction: neoliberal restructuring, global-
ization, and financialization
Escape Route # 1: Neoliberal 
Restructuring
Neoliberal restructuring took the form of Reaganism 
and Thatcherism in the North and Structural Adjust-
ment in the South. The aim was to invigorate capital 
accumulation, and this was to be done by 1) removing 
state constraints on the growth, use, and flow of capital 
and wealth; and 2) redistributing income from the poor 
and middle classes to the rich on the theory that the rich 
would then be motivated to invest and reignite economic 
growth.
The problem with this formula was that in redistrib-
uting income to the rich, you were gutting the incomes 
of the poor and middle classes, thus restricting demand, 
while not necessarily inducing the rich to invest more 
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2in production. In fact, it could be more profitable to in-
vest in speculation. Moreover, this strategy, in the long 
run, aggravated the basic problem, in that investment in 
production would add to already installed productive ca-
pacity.
In fact, neoliberal restructuring, which was general-
ized in the North and south during the eighties and nine-
ties, had a poor record in terms of growth: Global growth 
averaged 1.1 percent in the 1990s and 1.4 percent in the 
‘80s, compared with 3.5 percent in the 1960s and 2.4 
percent in the ‘70s, when state interventionist policies 
were dominant. Neoliberal restructuring could not shake 
off stagnation.
Escape Route # 2: Globalization
The second escape route global capital took to counter 
stagnation was »extensive accumulation« or globaliza-
tion, or the rapid integration of semi-capitalist, non-capi-
talist, or pre-capitalist areas into the global market econ-
omy. Rosa Luxemburg, who was not only a great radical 
but a great economist, saw this long ago in her classic 
»The Accumulation of Capital« as necessary to shore up 
the rate of profit in the metropolitan economies.
How? By gaining access to cheap labor, by gaining new, 
albeit limited, markets, by gaining new sources of cheap 
agricultural and raw material products, and by bringing 
into being new areas for investment in infrastructure. In-
tegration is accomplished via trade liberalization, remov-
ing barriers to the mobility of global capital, and abolish-
ing barriers to foreign investment.
China is, of course, the most prominent case of a non-
capitalist area to be integrated into the global capitalist 
economy over the last 25 years.
By the middle of the first decade of the 21st century, 
roughly 40-50 percent of the profits of US corporations 
came from their operations and sales abroad, especially 
in China.
The problem with this escape route from stagnation is 
that it exacerbates the problem of overproduction because 
it adds to productive capacity. A tremendous amount of 
manufacturing capacity has been added in China over 
the last 25 years, and this has had a depressing effect 
on prices and profits. Not surprisingly, by around 1997, 
the profits of US corporations stopped growing. Accord-
ing to one calculation, the profit rate of the Fortune 500 
went from 7.15 in 1960-69 to 5.30 in 1980-90 to 2.29 in 
1990-99 to 1.32 in 2000-2002. By the end of the 1990s, 
with excess capacity in almost every industry, the gap 
between productive capacity and sales was the largest 
since the Great Depression. From this perspective, that 
of overproduction, globalization was not, contrary to the 
interpretations of many of those who celebrated it and 
those who criticized it, a higher stage of capitalism but 
as a desperate effort by capital to escape the conundrum 
of overproduction. There was nothing progressive about 
globalization.
Escape Route # 3: Financialization
Given the limited gains in countering the depressive im-
pact of overproduction via neoliberal restructuring and 
globalization, the third escape route – financialization – 
became very critical for maintaining and raising profit-
ability.
With investment in industry and agriculture yielding 
low profits owing to overcapacity, large amounts of sur-
plus funds were circulating in or were being invested and 
reinvested in the financial sector – that is, the financial 
sector was turning on itself.
The result was an increased bifurcation between a hy-
peractive financial economy and a stagnant real econo-
my. As one financial executive noted in the pages of the 
Financial Times, »there has been an increasing discon-
nect between the real and financial economies in the last 
few years. The real economy has grown … but nothing 
like that of the financial economy – until it imploded.« 
What this observer did not tell us was that the disconnect 
between the real and the financial economy is not ac-
cidental – that the financial economy exploded precisely 
to make up for the stagnation owing to overproduction of 
the real economy
One indicator of the super-profitability of the financial 
sector is that while profits in the US manufacturing sec-
tor came to one percent of US gross domestic product 
(GDP), profits in the financial sector came to two per-
cent. Another was the fact that 40 percent of the total 
profits of US financial and non-financial corporations 
was accounted for by the financial sector although it was 
responsible for only five percent of US gross domestic 
product (and even that was likely to be an overestimate).
The problem with investing in financial sector opera-
tions is that it is tantamount to squeezing value out of 
already created value. It may create profit, yes, but it 
does not create new value – only industry, agricultural, 
trade, and services create new value. Because profit is 
not based on value that is created, investment operations 
become very volatile and prices of stocks, bonds, and 
other forms of investment can depart very radically from 
their real value – for instance, the stock of Internet start-
ups may keep rising to heights unknown, driven mainly 
by upwardly spiraling financial valuations.
Profits then depend on taking advantage of upward 
price departures from the value of commodities, then 
selling before reality enforces a »correction,« that is a 
crash back to real values. The radical rise of prices of an 
asset far beyond real values is what is called the forma-
tion of a bubble.
Profitability being dependent on speculative coups, it is 
not surprising that the finance sector lurches from one bub-
3ble to another, or from one speculative mania to another. 
Because it is driven by speculative mania, finance driven 
capitalism has experienced about 100 financial crises 
since capital markets were deregulated and liberalized in 
the 1980s, the most serious before the current crisis be-
ing the Asian Financial Crisis of 1997.
Dynamics of the Subprime Implosion
I will not go in detail into the dynamics of the current cri-
sis, which stemmed from the collapse of the US housing 
market, also known as the Subprime Implosion. Some 
key dimensions of it, like Alan Greenspan’s encourag-
ing the housing bubble by cutting the prime rate to a 
45-year-low of 1 per cent in June 2003 and keeping it 
there for over a year to counter the recessionary effects of 
the bursting of the technology bubble of the earlu 1990’s, 
were already mentioned yesterday. Let me just highlight 
a few other points.
The subprime mortgage crisis was not a case of sup-
ply outrunning real demand. The »demand« was largely 
fabricated by speculative mania on the part of developers 
and financiers that wanted to make great profits from 
their access to foreign money – most of it Asian and Chi-
nese in origin – that flooded the US in the last decade. 
Big ticket mortgages were aggressively sold to millions 
who could not normally afford them by offering low 
»teaser« interest rates that would later be readjusted to 
jack up payments from the new homeowners.
How did problematic mortgages become such a mas-
sive problem? The reason is that these assets were then 
»securitized« – that is converted into spectral commodi-
ties called »collateralized debt obligations« (CDOs) that 
enabled speculation on the odds that the mortgage would 
not be paid. These assets were then bundled with other 
assets and traded by the mortgage originators working 
with different layers of middlemen who understated risk 
so as to offload them as quickly as possible to other banks 
and institutional investors. These institutions in turn of-
floaded these securities onto other banks and foreign fi-
nancial institutions.
The idea was to make a sale quickly, get your money 
upfront and make a tidy profit, while foisting the risk on 
the suckers down the line – the hundreds of thousands 
of institutions and individual investors that bought the 
mortgage-tied securities. This was called »spreading the 
risk,« and it was actually seen as a good thing because it 
lightened the balance sheet of financial institutions, en-
abling them to engage in other lending activities.
When the interest rates were raised on the subprime 
loans, adjustable mortgage, and other housing loans, 
the game was up. There are about four million subprime 
mortgages which will likely go into default in the next 
two years, and five million more defaults from adjust-
able rate mortgages and other »flexible loans« that were 
geared to snag the most reluctant potential homebuyer 
will occur over the next several years. But securities 
whose value run into as much as $2 trillion had already 
been injected, like virus, into the global financial system. 
Global capitalism’s gigantic circulatory system was fa-
tally infected. And, as with a plague, we don’t know who 
and how many are fatally infected until they keel over 
because the whole financial system has become so non-
transparent owing to lack of regulation.
Collapse of the Real Economy
We are now at that juncture where instead of perform-
ing their primordial task of lending to facilitate produc-
tive activity, the banks are holding on to their cash or 
buying up rivals to strengthen their financial base. Not 
surprisingly, with global capitalism’s circulatory sys-
tem seizing up, it was only a matter of time before the 
real economy would contract, as it has with frightening 
speed in the last few weeks. Woolworth, a retail icon, has 
folded in Britain, the US auto industry is on emergency 
care, BMW’s profits went down by nearly 90 per cent, 
and even mighty Toyota has suffered an unprecedented 
decline in its profits. With American consumer demand 
plummeting, China and East Asia have seen their goods 
rotting on the docks, bringing about a sharp contraction 
of their economies and massive layoffs.
Globalization has ensured that economies that went up 
together in the boom would also go down together, with 
unparalleled speed, in the bust, the end of which is no-
where to be discerned. 
Let me just pause here to say that the reason I have 
gone into some detail about the causes and dynamics of 
the crisis is to underline the fact that what we have un-
folding before us is not a crisis of the neoliberal variant 
of capitalism but the crisis of capitalism. 
Global Social Democracy: the Capitalist 
Response
With the collapse of globalization and the deregulated 
market going haywire, the neoliberal metaphysics that 
propped up contemporary capitalism has been thorough-
ly discredited, though it will undoubtedly engage in some 
rearguard action. 
I think that there is a real panic out there among the 
establishment and real disarray and a sinking feeling that 
things will get worse before they get better and that the 
old neoliberal institutions, like the IMF, WTO, and G 20 
have become irrelevant, even as Keynesian methods of 
deficit spending and monetary easing might have very 
limited effects. Increasingly the more intelligent intellec-
tuals of the establishment are realizing that we are just 
at the beginning of the global freefall and don‘t really 
know when we are going to hit rock bottom and once we 
4reach it, how long the global economy will lie there.  In-
deed, the best image I can conjure of the global economy 
is that of a German World War II U-Boat that has been 
depthcharged in the mid-Atlantic by British destroyers, 
and it‘s descending rapidly to the ocean bottom, and 
once it reaches the bottom, you don‘t know how the crew 
is going to get the submarine back up.  Will the crew‘s 
tortuous maneuvers to get some compressed air into the 
damaged ballast tanks get it back to the surface, as in 
Wolfgang Petersen’s classic film Das Boot, or will the 
U-boat just stay at the bottom?  Will Keynesian methods 
of reflation work today?  The more critical thinkers of 
capital like Martin Wolf and Paul Krugman are not tak-
ing bets on it. 
The two things we can be certain of is that one, neo-
liberal approaches are thoroughly discredited, and two, 
the facts on the ground will dictate what those who wish 
to save the system will do, not any predetermined ideo-
logical limits. So let us disabuse ourselves of the notion 
that neoliberal principles will constitute red lines beyond 
which they will not go.
Let me be more specific. I think that the actions of the 
new Obama administration in Washington clearly consti-
tute a break with neoliberalism. One important question, 
of course, is how decisive and definitive the break with 
neoliberalism will be. Other questions, however, go to 
the heart of capitalism itself. Will government ownership, 
intervention, and control be exercised simply to stabilize 
capitalism, after which control will be given back to the 
corporate elites? Are we going to see a second round 
of Keynesian capitalism, where the state and corporate 
elites along with labor work out a partnership based on 
industrial policy, growth, and high wages--though with 
a green dimension this time around? Or will we witness 
the beginnings of fundamental shifts in the ownership 
and control of the economy in a more popular direction? 
There are limits to reform in the system of global capi-
talism, but at no other time in the last half century have 
those limits seemed more fluid.
At this point, massive stimulus spending at record-
breaking levels–something anathema to neoliberals–has 
become practice, the only difference among Northern 
elites being how much stimulus spending it will take to 
refloat the submarine.. On this, Obama has become the 
super-Keynesian. Nationalization of the banks–another 
practice condemned by neoliberalism---is also well in 
progress, and the questions that divide the elites is how 
aggressively the government will exercise its control of 
the majority shares of the stocks and whether it will re-
turn the banks to private management once the crisis is 
over. Reprivatization is not, contrary to some of the com-
ments here yesterday, is not a predetermined fact. The 
facts on the ground will determine the answer to these 
questions, for the task at hand for the state managers of 
capitalism is not whether or not the solutions are in line 
with a discredited doctrine but what it will take to save 
capitalism.
Beyond deficit spending and nationalization, I think 
that there will increasingly be a debate within the es-
tablishment on whether to go on the path of what I call 
»Global Social Democracy«, or GSD, in order to respond 
to capitalism’s desperate dual needs for stabilization and 
legitimacy.
Even before the full unfolding of the financial crisis, 
partisans of GSD had already been positioning it as al-
ternative to neoliberal globalization in response to the 
stresses and strains being provoked by the latter. One 
personality associated with it is British Prime Minister 
Gordon Brown, who led the initial European response 
to the financial meltdown via the partial nationalization 
of the banks. Widely regarded as the godfather of the 
»Make Poverty History« campaign in the United King-
dom, Brown, while he was still the British chancellor, 
proposed what he called an »alliance capitalism« be-
tween market and state institutions that would reproduce 
at the global stage what he said Franklin Roosevelt did 
for the national economy: »securing the benefits of the 
market while taming its excesses.« This must be a sys-
tem, continued Brown, that »captures the full benefits 
of global markets and capital flows, minimizes the risk 
of disruption, maximizes opportunity for all, and lifts up 
the most vulnerable - in short, the restoration in the inter-
national economy of public purpose and high ideals.«
Joining Brown in articulating the Global Social Dem-
ocratic discourse has been a diverse group consisting 
of, among others, the economist Jeffrey Sachs, George 
Soros, former UN Secretary General Kofi Annan, the 
sociologist David Held, Nobel laureate Joseph Stiglitz, 
and even Bill Gates. There are, of course, differences of 
nuance in the positions of these people, but the thrust of 
their perspectives is the same: to bring about a reformed 
social order and a reinvigorated ideological consensus 
for global capitalism.
Among the key propositions advanced by partisans of 
GSD are the following:
Globalization is essentially beneficial for the world; •	
the neoliberals have simply botched the job of manag-
ing it and selling it to the public; 
It is urgent to save globalization from the neoliberals •	
because globalization is reversible and may, in fact, al-
ready be in the process of being reversed; 
Growth must not be accompanied by increasing in-•	
equality; 
Trade must be promoted but subjected to social and •	
environmental conditions; 
Unilateralism must be avoided while at the same time •	
preserving while fundamentally reforming he multilat-
eral institutions and agreements; 
5Global social integration, or reducing inequalities both •	
within and across countries, must accompany global 
market integration; 
The global debt of developing countries must be can-•	
celled or radically reduced, so the resulting savings can 
be used to stimulate the local economy, thus contribut-
ing to global reflation; 
Poverty and environmental degradation are so severe •	
that a massive aid program or »Marshall Plan« from 
the North to the South must be mounted within the 
framework of the »Millennium Development Goals«; 
A »Second Green Revolution« must be put into mo-•	
tion, especially in Africa, through the widespread 
adoption of genetically engineered seeds. 
Huge investments must be devoted to push the glob-•	
al economy along more environmentally sustainable 
paths, with government taking a leading role (»Green 
Keynesianism« or »Green Capitalism«). 
The Limits of Global Social Democracy
Global Social Democracy has not received much criti-
cal attention, perhaps because, like the French generals 
at the start of the Second World War, many progressives 
are still fighting the last war, that is, against neoliberal-
ism. A critique is urgent, and not only because GSD is 
neoliberalism‘s most likely successor. More important, 
although GSD has some positive elements, it has, like the 
old Social Democratic Keynesian paradigm, a number of 
problematic features.
A critique might begin by highlighting problems with 
four central elements in the GSD perspective.
First, GSD shares neoliberalism‘s bias for globaliza-
tion, differentiating itself mainly by promising to promote 
globalization better than the neoliberals. Globalization, 
that is the rapid integration of production and markets 
but with effective regulation as EU Director General 
for Finance Jan Koopman, who describes himself as a 
Keynesian, puts it. This amounts to saying, however, that 
simply by adding the dimension of regulation, along with 
that of »global social integration,« an inherently socially 
and ecologically destructive and disruptive process can 
be made palatable and acceptable. GSD assumes that 
people really want to be part of a functionally integrated 
global economy where the barriers between the national 
and the international have disappeared. But would they 
not in fact prefer to be part of economies that are subject 
to local control and are buffered from the vagaries of the 
international economy? Indeed, today‘s swift downward 
trajectory of interconnected economies underscores the 
validity of one of anti-globalization movement‘s key 
criticisms of the globalization process..
Second, GSD shares neoliberalism‘s preference for the 
market as the principal mechanism for production, distri-
bution, and consumption, differentiating itself mainly by 
advocating state action to address market failures. The 
kind of globalization the world needs, according to Jef-
frey Sachs in The End of Poverty, would entail »harness-
ing...the remarkable power of trade and investment while 
acknowledging and addressing limitations through com-
pensatory collective action.« This is very different from 
saying that the citizenry and civil society must make the 
key economic decisions and the market, like the state bu-
reaucracy, is only one mechanism of implementation of 
democratic decision-making.
Third, GSD is a technocratic project, with experts 
hatching and pushing reforms on society from above, 
instead of being a participatory project where initiatives 
percolate from the ground up.
Fourth, GSD, while critical of neoliberalism, accepts 
the framework of monopoly capitalism, which rests fun-
damentally the concentrated private control of the means 
of production, deriving profit from the exploitative ex-
traction of surplus value from labor, is driven from crisis 
to crisis by inherent tendencies toward overproduction, 
and tends to push the environment to its limits in its 
search for profitability. Like traditional Keynesianism in 
the national arena, GSD seeks in the global arena a new 
class compromise that is accompanied by new methods 
to contain or minimize capitalism‘s tendency toward cri-
sis. Just as the old Social Democracy and the New Deal 
stabilized national capitalism, the historical function of 
Global Social Democracy is to iron out the contradic-
tions of contemporary global capitalism and to relegiti-
mize it after the crisis and chaos left by neoliberalism. 
GSD is, at root, about social management. What the 
left is about is about social liberation. GSD is about tech-
nocratic management, the left is about participatory de-
mocracy down to the level of economic enterprises. GSD 
is about making reconfiguring monopoly capitalism like 
the old Keynesianism did, though at a global level this 
time around. The left is about creating a post-capitalist 
system when it comes to property relations. GSD is about 
perfecting globalization. The left is about deglobalizing. 
GSD sees the future in Green Capitalism. The left sees 
decapitalization as a precondition for a truly ecologically 
benign social organization of the planet.
Like President Lula of Brazil, President Obama has 
a talent for rhetorically bridging different political dis-
courses. He is also a »blank slate« when it comes to eco-
nomics. Like FDR, he is not bound to the formulas of the 
ancien regime. Like Lula and FDR, he is a pragmatist 
whose key criterion is success at social management. As 
such, he is uniquely positioned to lead this ambitious re-
formist enterprise. Our task will not merely be how to 
support the positive aspects of the GSD program that 
promote the people’s welfare while opposing those that 
lead to a restabilization of capitalism, but more important 
how, in the process, we differentiate our enterprise from 
6the GSD enterprise and win people over to our strategic 
vision and program.
The Challenge from the Right
However, the choice in the coming period is not going to 
boil down between the Left and global social democracy. 
Would that it were that simple! In fact, there could be 
a response that would be anti-neoliberal in its econom-
ics, at least rhetorically, populist in its social policy, but 
exclusionist in its politics, evoking tribal as opposed to 
people’s solidarity. We can already see some of this in 
the approach of President Nicolas Sarkozy in France. . 
Declaring that »laissez-faire capitalism is dead,« he has 
created a strategic investment fund of 20 billion euros to 
promote technological innovation, keep advanced indus-
tries in French hands, and save jobs. »The day we don‘t 
build trains, airplanes, automobiles, and ships, what will 
be left of the French economy?« he recently asked rhe-
torically. »Memories. I will not make France a simple 
tourist reserve.« This kind of aggressive industrial policy 
aimed at shoring up key sectors of the French capital-
ist class and winning over the country‘s traditional white 
working class can go hand-in-hand with the exclusionary 
anti-immigrant policies with which the French president 
has been associated.
Sarkozy’s conservative populism is relatively mild. 
There are more radical ones waiting in the wings, like 
the anti-Muslim movement of Gerd Wilders in the Neth-
erlands, which is said to be poised to win 28 per cent 
of the seats in the coming parliamentary elections, again 
with the same mix of communal solidarity, populist eco-
nomics, and authoritarian leadership. We know of such 
movements everywhere in the developed and developing 
world, and my worry is that it maybe be in the developing 
crisis that they might make their breakthrough to becom-
ing a critical mass.
The point is that things will become worse, much 
worse, before they become better, and the global crisis 
is not something that can be managed technocratically to 
a soft landing like the US Airways flight that was eased 
into a soft landing on the Hudson River in New York a 
few weeks ago. If Global Social Democracy fails in its 
effort to reinvigorate capitalism and the Left is unable 
to come out with a vision and program built on equality, 
justice, participatory democracy that appeals to people in 
a period of severe and prolonged crisis, then other forces 
will step in to fill the vacuum, as they did in the 1930’s. 
If there is anything that Rosa Luxemburg and Gramsci 
and Lenin can teach us today, it is that, good will, values, 
and vision are not enough, that in the end, politics in the 
sense of a powerful vision, an effective strategy of coali-
tion building, and wise supple tactics of building up a 
critical mass for winning power, with parliamentary and 
extra-parliamentary dimensions, is decisive. Nature ab-
hors a vacuum, and we must be ready to fill that vacuum 
or we lose, decisively, and this we cannot afford to this 
time around.
Reveille for Progressives
Let me sum up. While progressives were engaged in 
full-scale war against neoliberalism, reformist thinking 
was percolating in critical establishment circles. This 
thinking is now becoming policy, and progressives must 
work double time to engage it. It is not just a matter of 
moving from criticism to prescription. The challenge is 
to overcome the limits to the progressive political imagi-
nation imposed by the aggressiveness of the neoliberal 
challenge in the 1980s combined with the collapse of the 
bureaucratic socialist regimes in the early 1990s. Pro-
gressives should boldly aspire once again to paradigms 
of social organization that unabashedly aim for equality 
and participatory democratic control of both the national 
economy and the global economy as prerequisites for 
collective and individual liberation and, one must add, 
ecological stabilization.
That is a perspective that we must might fight for not 
simply in a battle for people’s minds but for their hearts 
and souls, and here the struggle is, on the one hand, 
against the technocratic capitalist restabilization schemes 
of Global Social Democracy and, on the other, the mass-
based heated capitalist restabilization schemes of nation-
alist and fundamentalist populism. Ideas are not enough, 
and what will be decisive is how one translates our ideas 
and our values and our vision into a winning strategy and 
tactics that can triumph democratically. We must move 
away from the economism to which the global left was 
reduced in the neoliberal era. Politics, in short, must once 
more be in command.
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